

明 杜堉
《蹴鞠仕女图》
Du Jin painting of
women playing cuju
(late 15th to early 16th
centuries).



注释 Endnotes

— Fotini LAZARIDOU-HATZIGOGA

- Historically there were two main styles of *cuju*: *Zhu Qiu* and *Bai Da*. *Bai Da* became dominant during the Song Dynasty, a style that attached much importance to developing personal skills. Scoring goals became obsolete when using this method, and it was the smaller number of fouls made by the players that decided the winner. For example, if the ball was not passed far enough to reach other team members, points were deducted. If the ball was kicked too far out, a large deduction from the score would result. Kicking the ball too low or turning at the wrong moment all led to fewer points. ("Cuju". *Wikipedia*. Accessed 8 April 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuju>)
历史上蹴鞠大体分为两种：“筑鞠”和“白打”。宋朝时白打盛行，它更加注重发展个人技巧。这一方法使入球积分被废弃,其犯规更少一方取得胜利。比如:如果球没有足够的传给对方球员会被扣分。如果球踢的太远会被大量扣分.球踢得太低或在不适当的时机旋转都会使得分降低。（「蹴鞠」，维基百科，阅于2012年4月8日，<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuju>）
- Michel Serres uses the examples of the ferret and the ball to propose a model of intersubjectivity or collectivity around the theory of the quasi-object. "‘We’: what does that mean? We are precisely the fluctuating moving back and forth of ‘I.’ The ‘I’ in the game is a token exchanged. And this passing, this network of passes, these vicariances of subjects weave the collection. I am I now, a subject, that is to say, exposed to being thrown down, exposed to falling, to being placed beneath the compact mass of the others; then you take the relay, you are substituted for ‘I’ and become it; later on, it is he who gives it to you, his work done, his danger finished, his part of the collective constructed. The ‘we’ is made by the bursts and occultations of the ‘I.’" (Michel SERRES, *The Parasite*, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 227)
米歇尔•赛瑞斯 (Michel SERRES) 通过鼬(雪貂)与球的例子来构建一种围绕假物 (准客体) 理论展开的互主体性 (主体间性) 或集体性。何谓“我们”？我们即“我”不断的流变往复。“我”是个在游戏中被交换的筹码。主体间的遭遇，传递过程本身及传递所需的网络构成了某种聚合。“我”是我现下，一个主体，就是说，暴露 (接受) 于遭遇 (挑战)，接受坠入，坠入他者集群中; 然后你接受你被 “我” 代替，并逐渐变成 “它”；假以时日，他将把 “它” 授予 “你”，届时其本身需要面对的危险就解除了，“我” 大可高枕无忧，因为 “它” 在集体中扮演的角色达成了完满。因此 “我们” 是通过 “我” 的绽出与隐匿所创造的。(赛瑞斯《寄生虫》，明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达大学出版社，2007年，227页)
- Nancy discusses community as sharing, a passage that cannot be completed. “Incompletion is its ‘principle,’ taking the term ‘incompletion’ in an active sense, however, as designating not insufficiency or lack, but the activity of sharing, the dynamic, if you will, of an uninterrupted passage through singular ruptures.” (Jean-Luc NANCY, *The Inoperative Community*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 35)
南希将共同体看作是分享，及一种不可完成的进程。“未完成性是其规律”，“不完全”一词的意思是更积极的，但未完成非指缺失或不足，相反，它是一个将单一片段或断裂串联起来的持续进程的分享的运动，它是活力的，如果你愿意。(卢克•南希《解构共同体》，明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达大学出版社，1991年，35页)
- The ideas of surplus and excess are crucial here. Critchley analyzes the function of the concept of infinity in Levinas and its formal resemblance to the ethical relation to the other. In both cases we encounter a “thought that thinks more than it can think, that has a surplus within itself,” that “sketches the contours of a relation to something that is always in excess of whatever idea I may have of it, that always escapes me.” (Simon CRITCHLEY, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance*, (London: Verso, 2007), 58)
剩余 (surplus) 与溢出 (excess) 这两个概念在这里尤其重要。西蒙•奎施里 (Simon CRITCHLEY) 曾指出列维纳斯的无限与他者伦理维度间在形式上的相似之处。无论是无限还是他者，我们都会在思考的过程中遇见一个“思于自身之外的思，即自有剩余的思。它将溢出这一关系，或果溢出我们概念边界的事勾勒了出来，逍遥于我们的掌控之外。(西蒙•奎施里《无尽之需: 义务之伦理，反抗之政治》，伦敦，Verso，2007年，58页)
- Along with existence and falling, thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) is for Heidegger a central feature of *Dasein*. According to Agamben, “Everything is complicated, in Heidegger, by the fact that *Dasein* is not simply, as in Sartre, thrown into the ‘there’ of a given contingency; instead, *Dasein* must rather itself be its ‘there,’ be the ‘there’ (*Da*) of Being.” And he continues: “*Ruinanz* [from the Latin *ruina*, ‘tumbling,’ ‘fall’] presents the same intertwining of the proper and the improper, the spontaneous and the factitious, as the ‘thrownness’ (*Geworfenheit*) of *Dasein*: ‘a movement that produces itself and that, nevertheless, does not produce itself, producing the emptiness in which it moves; for its emptiness is the possibility of movement.’” (Giorgio AGAMBEN, *Potentialities: collected essays in philosophy*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 191.)
随着存在与坠入，抛掷性 (*Geworfenheit*) 是海德格尔的达在 (*Dasein*) 的中心特征之一。阿甘本说：“沙特认为达在的是被抛掷 “在” 某偶然中，而在海德格尔的体系中，达在在于达，达之自在是为达在。通过坠落 (*Ruinanz*) 显现的内部联系是和真诚性与非真诚性，自发与人为的交互状态共通的，达在的 “被抛掷–抛掷” 是一种 ‘自我生成，而又不生成自我，而只生成自我运动所需虚空性的运动。其本身的虚空恰恰是其运动可能性的前提。” (古典乔•阿甘本《诸潜在：哲学短文集》，斯坦福，斯坦福大学出版社，1999年，191页)

- “What is walking but, as the German psychiatrist Erwin Straus once put it, ‘a continuously arrested falling’, a propulsive act in which one constantly throws oneself off-balance while managing to catch oneself just in time—and a little further ahead—with the other foot?” (Aaron SHUSTER. “Stanley Brouwn”. *Frieze*, Issue 91, May 2005. Accessed 12 January 2012. http://www.frieze.com/issue/review/stanley_brouwn/)
“德国临床心理学家埃尔文•斯特劳斯曾说：行走即不停被打断的跌倒，一个不断破坏自己平衡又及时找回平衡的推进式运动——每次都向前挪一点——通过另一只脚? (艾隆•舒斯特「Stanley Brouwn」，《Frieze》，第91期，2005年5月。阅于2012年1月12日，http://frieze.com/issue/review/stanley_brouwn/)
- It’s interesting here to note the various meanings of the verb *bear*: (1) carry, convey, have or display as a visible mark or feature, be called by; (2) support, take responsibility for, be able to accept or stand up to; (3) endure; (4) give birth to, produce; (5) turn and proceed in a specified direction.
有趣的是这里注意到 “bear” 这一动词的多重含义：1) 肩负，表达，具有或展现着某种可见的记号或特征，被叫做... 2) 支撑，为...负责，能接受或坚守某种立场 3) 承受 4) 诞生，生产，创造 5) 转向某方并前进。
- Drawing from Aristotle and Varro, Agamben argues for gesture as a third type of action that breaks with the “false alternative between ends and means,” being instead the exhibition of a mediality, where “nothing is being produced or acted, but rather something is being endured and supported.” Virmo’s concept of virtuosity is also of relevance here. Defined as an activity without an end product that requires the presence of others, all virtuosity is “intrinsically political.” See Giorgio AGAMBEN. *Means without end*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000 and Paolo VIRNO. *A Grammar of the Multitude*. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), 2004.
借鉴了亚里士多德与菲洛 (Varro) 的思想，阿甘本提出姿态 (gesture) 是区别于 “目的与手段的虚妄差异” 的第三种行为。作为一种媒介性的展现，在姿态中 “没有什么被生产或实行，但我们的确在支持并承受某事物”。维尔诺 (Virmo) 所提倡的行家里手 (virtuosity) 在这里也很重要。一个需要他者的在场，又没有结果或成品的行为 “本身就是政治性的”。(见阿甘本《没有目的的手段》，明尼阿波利斯，明尼苏达大学出版社，2000年与维尔诺《诸众之语法》，洛杉矶，Semiotext(e)出版社，2004年)
- In his poem on the orange, Francis Ponge compares the fruit with a sponge in its attempt to recover its content after having been squeezed. While the sponge slowly regains its shape, the orange’s expression is accompanied by “the bitter awareness of a premature ejaculation of seeds.” Later on, Ponge turns to the seed itself: “It is within this seed that one finds—after the sensational explosion of the Chinese lantern of flavors, colors and perfumes which is the fruited ball itself—the relative hardness and greenness (not entirely tasteless, by the way) of the wood, the branch, the leaf; in short, the puny albeit prime purpose of the fruit.” (Francis PONGE, *The Voice of Things*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1972), 37)
弗朗西斯•彭格 (Francis Ponge) 在他以橘子为主题的诗作中将橘子比作一块海绵，并试图以此重新发现二者在水分被挤干之后剩下的 “内容”。海绵会慢慢恢复原来的形状，而被榨干橘子却提醒我们要有 “对种子早泄这一事实的痛苦认识”。当谈到种子这一问题的时候，彭格说：“在种子中我们找到——即在橘子之所以为水果的各种味觉，颜色与香味爆发之后——其作为植物或树木的坚硬与青涩，开始体验超于其水果目的之外的构成，如枝干与树叶等等。” (见彭格《物之声》，纽约，McGraw-Hill Book Company，1972年，37页)
- Seed dormancy is defined as a seed failing to germinate under environmental conditions optimal for germination, normally when the environment is at a suitable temperature with proper soil moisture. This true dormancy or innate dormancy is therefore caused by conditions within the seed that prevent germination. Thus dormancy is a state of the seed, not of the environment. Induced dormancy, enforced dormancy or seed quiescence occurs when a seed fails to germinate because the external environmental conditions are inappropriate for germination, mostly in response to conditions being too dark or light, too cold or hot, or too dry. ("Seed". *Wikipedia*. Accessed 12 April 2012. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seed>)
种子休眠的定义是指可发芽的种子由于自在原因，在适宜的环境条件下仍不能萌发的现象。适宜的环境意指有利于萌发的温度与土壤湿度。因此我们说种子休眠缘自内因而不是外因，它是种子的存在状态。相比之下，诱导休眠，强制休眠或种子静歇指在外部环境不适宜种子萌芽的情况下的休眠，如阴暗，强光，低温，高温与干旱等。(「种子」维基百科，阅于2012年4月12日，<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seed>)
- Zìrán* (自然) is a key concept in Daoism that is often translated as “self so; so of its own; so of itself” and “naturally; spontaneously; freely.” According to Qingjie James Wang, a more appropriate translation would be “it-self-so-ing” and “other-ing.” See Qingjie James WANG, “‘*It-self-so-ing*’ and ‘*Other-ing*’ in Lao Zi’s Concept of *Zi Ràn*.” Accessed 22 April 2012. http://www.confuchina.com/05_zongjiao/Lao_Zi's_Concept_of_Zi_Ran.htm.
自然是道家思想中的一个重要概念，在表达中同时具有自然如是的，自澄的，自发的，自由的等多重指向。学者王庆节将自然进一步分成自我的自己而然与他者的自己而然。(见王庆节「老子的自然观念：自我的自己而然与他者的自己而然」，阅于2012年4月22日，http://www.confuchina.com/05zongjiao/Lao_Zi's_Concept_of_Zi_Ran.htm)
- “Still, the most beautiful rose would die in the desert.” (Fotini LAZARIDOU-HATZIGOGA, E-mail message to Twist OU, February 13, 2012.)
“最终，最美的玫瑰仍会凋零于荒漠。” (Fotini LAZARIDOU-HATZIGOGA，摘自与曲一箴的电子信，2013年2月13日)